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I. Statement of the Case
A.

Nature of the Case

This case arises out of territorial competition in the automotive paint and equipment supply
business, which is the industv supplying autobody repair shops. Appellant Wesco expanded into
the Eastern Idaho (Twin Falls, Pocatello, Idaho Falls) market by purchasing lhree stores.
Automotive Paint Warehouse ("APW") had long bken the wholesale supplier for those stores and
APW abruptly lost the market areato Wesco. APW's owners, Ernest and Davis, used their existing
Idaho corporation, Paint & Spray Supply, Inc. ("P&Sn), which already owned stores in the Boise
area, to open new stores in Eastern Idaho in an attempt to keep at least a part of the market.
What made this territorial competition out of the ordinary was the surprising decision by
almost all of Wesco's new employees to quit and go to work for P&S. The issue is why these
employees were willing to switch to P&S, and more importantly whether any of the employees did
anything legally inappropriate in making that syitch.

B.

Course ofproceedings Below
The Defendants' original motion for summaryjudgmentwasheard on July 10,2006.

Partial summary judgment was entered on September 6,2006 dismissing four of the original ten
counts' and completely dismissing three defendants2 Wesco twice moved for reconsideration, once

'Interference with Contract (Count El), Tortious Interference (Count IV), Violation of
Unfair Competition Act (Count VI), and Civil Conspiracy (Count IX).
2AutomotiveParts Warehouse, Inc. (APW), Holly Ernest and Tom Davis (owners of
APW and Paint & Spray Supply, Inc. (P&S).
Respondent.8 Brief
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with Judge Smith and once from Judge Harding. Both judges reaffirmed the summary judgment
against Wesco. Recently Wesco dismissed thirteen of the employee defendants with prejudice,
leaving only four of the original nineteen defendants. The result of the summary judgmen,t and the .
recent dismissal of most of the employees, leaves the current status of the Amended Complaint as:
-Dismissed entirely:
Count I11 (Interference with Contract),
Count IV: (Tortious Interference)
Count VI: (Violation of Unfair Competition Act)
Count IX: (Civil Conspiracy)
-Dismissed as to Ernest, Davis, P&S, APW, and Hugh Barkdull, leaving Brady
Barkdull and Mike Cook:
Count I: Interference with prospective economic advantage, and
Count 11: Breach of duty of loyalty.
-Dismissed as to Ernest, Davis, APW, but leaving P&S, Brady Barkdull,
Hugh Barkdull, and Mike Cook:
Count V: Unfair competition.
-Dismissed as to all defendants, except Mike Cook:
Count VII (Computer Fraud Act)
Count VIII (Misappropriation of Trade Secrets)
Count X (Conversion)
Shortly before the case was to be tried, Wesco made a motion for certification of a final judgment.

Transcript, March 5,2008, p. 1. Wesco, in making that motion acknowledged that it only had a
"very little case" left because the "very large issues" had all been resolved against Wesco.

Transcript, March 5,2008, p. 11. The court then granted the motion for the appeal, on the basis that
the summary judgment ruling dealt with "the major part of this case" and that guidance is necessary
from the Supreme Court in order to prevent thii case having to be tried twice. Transcript, March

5,2008, p. 15-16. The defendants' attorney then requested permission to file a renewed motion for
complete summary judgment on the new evidence obtained since the partial summary judgment in
2006, and the court granted permission for an attempt at a complete summary judgment.
The remaining defendants then filed a renewed motion for summary judgment, relying on
a much,more complete record than the court had in 2006, which included numerous remaining
depositions and additional affidavits. The court denied the renewed motion for complete summary
judgment. R. Vol. VII, p. 1274- 1446 (Vol. VIII). The denial ofthis renewed motion forms the basis
of the Cross-Appeal.
C.

concise Statement of Facts.

The following chronology of facts are undisputed:

Julv: On a Friday morning a fax was sent to the employees of the three Idaho stores
Wesco had just purchased. The fax informed the employees that their stores have been bought and
informed them that they now worked for Wesco. This was the first time the employees heard the
stores had been purchased by Wesco. R. Vol. IV, p. 602,605 (Peck, 12:6-25,21: 8-22:ll); R. Vol.
IV, p. 639 (Johnston, 11: 11-14:7); R. Vol. IV, p. 657 (Dayley, 20:3-23).
Aumst 9-12: Ernest and Davis learned that Wesco was not going to continue supplying The
Eastern Idaho stores with paint from APW, and that Wesco would instead supply paint from its own
sources. Ernest and Davis decided to open new stores in Eastern Idaho, so that APW could
continue to supply paint to Eastern Idaho. Ernest and Davis already knew most of the customers in
the area and had a good reputation. They decided to recrnit Wesco's employees, thinking some of
the employees wouldrather continue to be affiliated withthem, and with APW, and would be willing
Respondent's Bnef
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to quit the new comer, Wesco. R. Vol. 111, p. 460, (Davis, 20:18- 22:7); R. Vol. 111, p. 434-435
(Ernest, 17:18-18:15).
August 11-17 : Ernest began recruiting Brady Barkdull and offered him a job at the new
stores and told him he wanted him to start on August 22. Barkdull said he would think about it.
Barkdull and Ernest met and talked by telephone several times over a period of days while Ernest
attempted to persuade Barkdull to make the switch. Barkdull wanted to know what the other
employees were going to do before he made up his mind. Ernest did not ask Barkdull to help recruit
other employees. R. Vol. 111, p. 578 (Barkdull, par. 2-6); R. Vol. 111, p. 474, (Barkdull, 87:17); R.
Vol. 111, p. 437-442 (Ernest, 20:3 - 25:22, esp. 21:3-9). When Barkdull first discusses the possible
job switch with other employees, it is after the other employees have already made up their minds
to quit. R. Vol. W . pp. 615 (Cristobal, 18:11-13). During this time Barkdull leaves all of the
recruiting up to Ernest and Davis. Not a single employee attributes their recruitment to Barkdull.
Aumst 17 (Wed): Ernest met with Hugh Barkduil in Preston and offered him a job. R. Vol.
111, p. 430 (Ernest, 13:l-10). Ernest later met with Mike Cook in Pocatello and offered him a job.

R. Vol. M, p. 489 (Cook, 50:25-52:21). That evening Ernest met with Jenny Hancock and offered
her a job. Barkdull was present, but Hancock's testimony is very clear that Ernest made the job offer
and that her decision to leave was not based on pressure from Barkdull. She has specifically denied
that Brady recruited her. R. Vol. V, p. 879; R. Vol. 111, p. 494 (Hancock, 22:14-17,23:8-14).
August 18 (Thur): Ernest met in the evening with the Twin Falls managers and salesmen,
including Travis Dayley, David Cristobal, Jeff Peck and Joel Johnston. He first took Cristobal,
Johnston, and Dayley out to dinner and offered them jobs. R. Vol. IV,pp. 614 (Cristobal, 16: 5Respondent's Brie?
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17:25). Barkdull was not at the meeting, and the employees did not discuss their decision with
Barkdull until after they hadmade up their minds to quit. R. Vol. IV. pp. 615 (Cristobal, l8:11-13).
The employees were curious if other employees were also being recruited and Ernest refused to tell
them ifthis was his plan. R. Vol. IV, p. 642 (Johnston, 23:2-24:13). Ernest made it clear that he was
going to open the new store in Twin Falls, with or without them, on Monday morning. R. Vol. IV,
p. 643 (Johnston, 25:6-8). After dinner the employees discussed their plans and decided that the

three of them would go to work for P&S, specifically because they were more comfortable working
with Ernest, whom they already knew, than with Wesco, for whom they had some mistrust as to their
job security. R. Vol. IV, p. 643 (Johnston, 26:15-25); R. Vol. IV,pp. 615 (Cristobal, 18:24-19:6).
Ernest and Davis then met separately with Peck in Twin Falls and offered him a job. Peck
told Ernest and Davis he wanted to sleep on it, but called Ernest the next morning at 7:30 a.m. and
accepted the offer. Barkdull was not involved in this, and Peck did not discuss his decision with
Barkdull until after Peck had made up his mind. The first time Peck heard about the job opporhmity
was on the

from Ernest. Peck credits Ernest and Davis entirely with his recruitment. R. Vol.

IV, pp. 674-675,679 (Peck, 32:16-34:24,50:1-12).

Sometime later that night, the Twin Falls delivery girl, Chantil Dobbs learns that Dayley,
Cristobal and Johnston have decided to resign and go to work for Wesco. She decides to quit as she
doesn't want to be the only one left at the store. R. Vol. IV, p. 652-653 (Dobbs, 12:7-14:3)

In Idaho Falls, Hancock tells two other employees, Thompson and McClure (counter help
and delivery) about her decision to leave Wesco and go to work for P&S. They decide to quit too,
although McClure does not actually quit until a week later when she is back from her vacation.
Respondent's Bticf
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August 19 (Friday): In Pocatello Mike Cook speaks with Reid, Stairs, and Thomson (counter
help and delivery) about his decision to quit and go to work for P&S. They decide to quit. This is
the first day any of the other Pocatello employees had heard of P&S opening new stores. Brady
Barkdull was not part of this conversation. R. Vol. IV, p. 505 (Reid, 6:8-7:9). On this same day
Cook finds aresignation form on the internet, andmentions it to other employees, who decide to use
the same fonn, rather than write their own. R. Vol. VII, par. 11. Jenny Hancock drafted her own
resignation letter and at least one of the other employees decided to use the same letter. From all
three stores resignations are sent by facsimile to Wesco between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., which is
between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m. in Washington. This is the same manner in which the employees had
been idoimed, on July 29, around 5:00 p.m., that the stores had been bought.
Aumst 19-29: The employees start work at P&S at varying times between 7:00 p.m. on
Friday, August 19 and Monday August 29. The employees went to work for P&S at the same pay
rate they had been receiving at Wesco. R. Vol. 111, p. 492 (I3ancock, 7:7-15).
Auaust 22 (Monday): The new P&S stores opened for business in Twin Falls and Pocatello.
The Idaho Falls store is not opened until some time later. The salesmen, along with Ernest and
Davis, and other employees 60m Utah, begin contacting customers and delivering letters. R. Vol.
V, p. 903-904 (Hansen Affidavit, par. 7-9.)
By Monday August22 Wesco has organized aresponse tp P&SYsnew stores and uses a sales
force of Wesco employees and factory representatives to begin making calls on all of the autobody
paint shops in Eastern Idaho. They contact virtually all customers by Wednesday, August 25. R.
Vol. VII, p. 1237 (Evans, 635-64:4).
Respondent's Brief
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Additional Issues Presented on Appeal
5.

Whether the District Court erred by failing to grant theDefendant's Renewed Motion

for Summary Judgment, granting a full and final judgment dismissing the entire case.

III.

Standard of Review
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law." IRCP 56(c). Baxter v Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000).
Although the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
rests with the moving party, once that burden has been met, the burden shifts to the non-moving
party to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. Smith v. Meridian

Joint School District #2, 128 Idaho 714,918 P.2d 583 (1996); Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86,
867 P.2d 960 (1994). Importantly, the non-moving party may not simply rest upon the mere
allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue of fact to be resolved at trial. IRCP 56(e), Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho at 170; Smith

v. Meridian Joint School District #2, 128 Idaho at 719. If there is an absence of evidence on a
dispositive issue for which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, that party must "go
beyond the pleadings and by

... affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,324-25,106 S.Ct. 2548,91 L.Ed.2d265 (1986). Surnmaryjudgment

Respondent's Brief
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is mandated against the nonmoving party who thereafter fails to present sufficient evidence to
establish a genuine issue of fact for trial. Id. at 322, 324-25
Further, a non-moving party's case must be anchored in something more solid than
speculation. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Edwards
v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 853,727 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App.1986). "There is no issue

for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict
for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted).

IV.

Argument
A.

Introduction

Wesco begins its argument at page 13 of Appellant's Brief by stating that "had the Wesco
employees simply decided to quit of their own accord, Wesco would have no complaint." Wesco
continues, "Had Ernest, Davis, and P&S directly recruited Wesco employees and persuaded them,
through higher pay, promotions, or other inducements, to quit Wesco and become P&S employees,
Wesco would have no Complaint." This is afair assessment of the law. More importantly, it is also

a fair assessment of the facts: (1) The employees did decide to quit of their own accord, each for his
or her own reasons; and (2) Ernest and Davis, on behalf of P&S, did all of the recruiting of Wesco's
key employees (managers and sales people) without any help from Barkdull. In deed, Ernest and
Davis successfully recruited the key employees, not because of offering higher pay, or promotions,
but because of having already having earned the key employee's trust through APW, especially when
compared to the distrust created by Wesco in the three weeks the employees worked for Wesco.
Respondent's Brief
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The main factual issue in the case is found within Wesco's next statement: "The central fact
is that Barkdull, at the behest of Ernest, Davis, and P&S, solicited all of Wesco's Idaho managers
and nearly its entire workforce to abruptly quit en rnasse and join P&S in direct competition with
Wesco." This bold statement is exactly the required fact that is entirely absent from the record, and
it is this absence that justifies this court granting full summary judgment against Wesco. There is
no evidence whatsoever that Barkdull solicited even a single employee to quit and work for P&S.
Rather, there is an abundance of positive evidence as to how each employee was recruited. There
is no question that the recruitment of the managers and sales people was done entirely by Ernest and
Davis on behalf of P&S and there is no serious legal dispute as to the right of Ernest, Davis, and
P&S to recruit Wesco's employees.

B.

General Statement of Facts

Ernest and Davis are the owners of Automotive Paint Warehouse ("APW"), which has
wholesaled automotive paint and supplies to retail stores in Utah and Idaho for many years.
Specifically, relevant to this case, APW was the primary wholesale supplier for three retail paint
stores in Twin Falls, Pocatello, and Idaho Falls.
Wesco purchased the three stores from their prior owner and took control of the stores on
July 28,2005. The employees of the stores learned their stores had been purchased by Wesco when
they received a fax from Wesco's headquarters on a Friday morning informing them that they now
worked for Wesco. Some of them were ordered to report for duty on Saturday, the next day, for a
mandatary all day inventory. R. Vol. IV, p. 602 (Johnston, 11:13).

Reqonded's Brief
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Wesco is a Washington corporation which owns not only retail stores, but also owns the
wholesale supply line to those stores, throughout the Northwest. Wesco's expansion into the Idaho
market was accomplished by buying out the three Eastern Idaho stores. Because Wesco's business
model is to own both the wholesale and retail supply chain in any area where it competes, Wesco
immediately began supplying its new Idaho stores out of Washington, terminating APW's sales to
the three stores in Eastern Idaho and taking a serious bite out of APW's revenues and its market
territory. R. Vol. In, p. 457 (Ernest, 17:4-15).
Rather than accept the loss of the Eastern Idaho market to Wesco, Ernest and Davis decided
to use their existing Idaho corporation, Paint & Spray Supply (P&S), which had been operating retail
storesin the Boise area for many years, to open new P&S stores in Twin Falls, Pocatello and Idaho
Falls. Emest and Davis knew the Eastern I d a h market well, and were acquainted with the
employees of the three stores Wesco had just purchased. They also knew most of the owners of the
autobody shops which are the customers of thestores. Because Ernest and Davis had a longtenn
relationship with both the employees and the customers, they were willing to invest in the new
stores, hoping to keep the Eastern Idaho market for APW, rather thansee the market area go entirely
to Wesc6. They correctly perceived that Wesco, as the new comer in the area, may not be as well
prepared as it needed to be, if it hoped to capture'the Idaho market.
Ernest and Davis moved quickly, realizing that Wesco would only become more entrenched
with the passage of time. They opened their new stores on August 22, only 3 weeks after Wesco's
move into the area. Part of their strategy was to approach the key employees of Wesco's new stores
and offer them jobs. Ernest and Davis met with each of the managers and salesmen on August 17
Respendmt's Brief
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and 18 (Wednesday and Thursday) and offered them jobs to start immediately. Most of the
employees resigned from Wesco on August 19 (Friday) and the new P&S stores opened for business
on August 22 (Monday).
A key fact in this case is that it was not "over zealous recruiting" that motivated the
employees to leave Wesco; rather, it was Wesco itself. It is well established that some of the
employees were concerned-about being bought by an out of state corporation. For instance, the Twin
Falls cmp1oyees.had been notified of Wesco's purchase of the stores when they came to work one
morning and found a fax informing them they had been bought. The fax informed them that they
were to cancel their plans and show up for work on Saturday to perform an inventory. R. Vol. IV,
p.639 (Johnston. 11:ll-12:13); R. Vol. IV, p. 605 (Peck, 21:2-22); R. Vol. VI, p. 615 (Cristobal,
20: 12-17). Others were concerned about the treatment they were receiving from Wesco's managers.
Several mentioned trouble getting through with,phone calls to Wesco's main office and concern
about communication with the new company. R. Vol. IV, p: 602 (Johnston, 125-25). Some
employees were concerned about Wesco's ability to provide inventory for their customers on a
timely basis and that Wesco's support was lacking compared to what they had been used to with
APW. R. Vo.III, p. 597 (Hancock, 40:lO-23). All of this caused the employees to fear for the
stability of their careers. Some wondered if lay offi were eminent or if they wouldbe firedto make
room for out of state replacements. R. Vol. IV, p. 657, (Dayley, 19:21-26:22). Finally, Wesco
required each employee to sign an"Acknoivledgment" form which informed them that the were "atwill," meaning that "either party to the relationship can terminate the employment with or without
notice with or without cause." R. Vol. ID, p. 519. Many of the employees were nervous when they
Respondent's Brief
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learned that they could be fired at any time at Wesco's whim. When Wesco's tactics in taking over
the Idaho stores is balanced against the stability promised by Ernest and Davis, it becomesclear that
the employees were acting in their own self interest, not out of a malicious intent to put Wesco out
of business.
The point is that the employees each made a personal decision to work where they felt most
secure. This included a desire to work for Ernest and Davis, to be supplied by APW, and to be part
of P&S' new stores. None of the employees expressed any hatred or serious resentment toward
Wesco (until Wesco sued them.) R. Vol. IV,p. 682 (Peck, 68:24); p. 664-665 (Dayley, 46:lO-47:5,
49:8-19); p. 613-614 (Cristobal, 12:18-15:7); p. 640 (Johnston, 14:l-15:18).
The employees were not offered exorbitant compensation packages. They were promised
that their compensation would not decrease and that they would retain the same job title. It is true
that Ernest realized his new stores would benefit from hiring the good people that he already knew
and had been dealing with for up to twenty years. He set out to see if he could hire some of them
and create a new opportunity that was better for himself and for them. To his surprise he ended up
with almost all of the employees. The fact that most of the employees made a decision to work for

P&S does not make their conduct illegal. These were at-will employees,they were not bound by any
covenant not to compete, and they had the right to resign and go to work for P&S.
C.

Response to Misstatements of the Record Made by Wesco

It is much simpler when a motion for summary judgment is brought on a set of stipulated
facts, with the court only needing to correctly apply the law to the undisputed facts. This is not such

a case. Here it seems the parties generally agree on the law, but differ sharply on what facts are
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supported by the record, and specifically on what reasonable inferences can be drawn from the
evidence and testimony presented below. The respondents became concerned while reviewing
Wesco's brief that some ofthe statements made in Wesco's brief are not supported by the record.
Respondents are quite aware that Wesco, as the party opposing s u m m q judgment, is entitled to
every reasonable inference; however, those inferences must be based on the record. Following is a
list of Wesco's factual claims which are not reasonably inferred from the record:

"Ernest and Davis boasted to Wesco Vice President Roger Howe that ifthey couldnot work
out a deal to purchase the Idaho ~toresfrom'~aint
& Equipment, they would take Paint &
Equipment's employees. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.) Reviewing the cited record makes it clear that
Wesco's use of the word "boasted" is an inappropriate characterization. The quoted misstatement
ignores the purpose of this meeting, which was Wesco coming to Ernest and Davis and offering to
buy out APW and P&S from Ernest and Davis. The response from Ernest and Davis was that they
were well established in Idaho and were well equipped to compete in Idaho because, through APW,
they knew both the customers and existing employees better than an outsider, such as Wesco. This
was proven to be more of a fair warning than a boast. Ernest's statements, however characterized,
are irrelevant, of course, because there is no serious question that Ernest and Davis, on behalf of

P&S, had the perfect right to compete for the customers and to attempt to recruit at-will employees
from their competitors.

"At the time of Wesco'spurchase of the Idaho Stores, Barkdull was Paint & Equipment's
regional manager. . . Barkdull thus had supervisory responsibility over the Idaho Stores with the
managers of those stores reporting to him. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 7.) The record is clear that Mr.
Rupgndent's BSef
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Barkdull was not a "regional manager," he was "sales manager." R. Vol111,578 (Affidavit of
Barkdull, par. 2.); R. Vol. 111, 468 (3 1 : 16). As sales manager he had no direct authority over the
store managers or over the other employees; his responsibility was with sales. Likewise, the record
does not support the misstatement that the managers ofthe stores reported to Barkdull. The
misstatement illustrates Wesco's attempts to overstate Brady Barkdull's significance in the case,
which is a key element of Wesco's appeal.
"Barkdull's brother, defendant Hugh Barkdull, headed outside salesfor the Idaho Stores at
the time Wescopurchased the Idaho Stores. His job duties included making shop and sales calls to
all of the body shops in the area. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 7.) At the relevant time in this case, Hugh

was the outside salesmen for the Pocatello Store only, not for all of the stores. R. Vol. 111,481 (10:9,
20-22). The record cited is clear that Hugh Barkdull was an outside sales manager years earlier when
he worked for Brady Industrial Supply, an unrelated company. Just as with Brady, Wesco is
misrepresenting the record to make it appear that Hugh was more significant than he was.
"Over the next few days, Ernest and Davis, on behalf of APW/P&S, formulated a plan to
steal as many of Wesco's employees in the Eastern Idaho market as possible andrecruitedBarkdu11
as an ally. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 8. repeated at p. 29.) To support this statement Wesco cites to

R. Vol. III, pp. 460-62, which is a portion of the Davis deposition. A review of that testimony
reveals that there is no evidence there that Ernest and Davis "recruited Barkdull as an ally" and that
the cited testimony does not support, or even give rise to an inference, that Barkdull was recmited
to help "steal" the other employees. The cited portion of the deposition actually makes it clear that
the opposite is true: Barkdull would not commit to ErnestlDavis and wanted to wait and see what
Respondent's Bricf
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other employees would do. That is the only citation to the record Wesco uses to establish that
Barkdull was sent to recruit other employees, and it fails entirely to support such an inference that
would contradict the remainder of the record, which establishes that Ernest and Davis did not recruit
Barkdull to help "steal" the other employees, nor did they ask for his assistance in starting up any
new stores. R. Vol. 111, p. 435 (18:s-15); R. Vol. 111, 578 (Affidavit of Barkdull, par. 3-5).
"While Barkdull was still a Wesco employee, Barkdull, Ernest, and Davis worked together
to carry out their plan. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 8.) There is no citation for this statement, and the

citation above it clearly does not establish that Barkdull was in on a plan to hire other employees.
The plan was solely that of Ernest and Davis, and it is beyond dispute that the law allow Ernest and
Davis to recruit Wesco's employees. The notion that Barkdull was the one doing the recruiting is
purely a work of fiction written, and oft repeated, by Wesco's attorneys.
"On August 13, 2005, Barkdull met with Ernest to scout out potential store sites for
P&S/APW. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 8.) This statement is misleading. The record is clear that Ernest
, made a job

offer to Barkdull while Barkdull was "riding along" with him. R. Vol. 111,439 (22:3-7)

It is no secret that Ernest was attempting to recruit Barkdull. The testimony makes it clear that
Ernest was talking to Barkdull while Emest looked for store sites. The record is also clear that
Ernest did not request that Barkdull assist him in recruiting other employees and that Barkdull "put
the ball in [Ernest's] court to recruit other employees" before Barkdull would commit to the job
offer. R. Vol. 111,pp. 441-442 (2421-25:18). As ruled by the lower court, even if Barkdull was
helping to find stores for P&S, this should be of no concern as the law is clear that he could have
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even been making preparations to open his own store; it should be considered even less of aproblem
if he was helping someone else prepare to compete. R. Vol. VIII, p. 1462-1463.

"Infact, Barkdull and Ernest delivered a letter to a Wesco customer prior to August 19,
2005, that identijed Barkdull as an employee of P&S; the letter was dated August 16, 2005, three
dysprior to the effective date ofBarkdull's subsequent resignation. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 8-9.)
This statement is a blatant misrepresentation of fact and of the record. It is a misstatement that
~ e s c has
o refused to let go of, even in the face of the lower court's finding that it was not supported
by the evidence. The record cited by Wesco does not establish the date, but makes it clear instead
that the witness, Harris, did not know what day he received the letter. R. Vol. 111, p. 532 (17:l-3).
Wesco also chooses to ignore evidence obtained after the summary judgment ruling, which now
makes it even more clear and undisputed that this letter was not delivered until August 22, after
Barkdull resigned. We now have the affidavit of C o ~ yHansen, the author of the letter, explaining
the August 16 date on the letter, and making it clear that the letter was not delivered to anyone until
after Brady had resigned from Wesco. R. Vol. V, pp. 903-904.

"Shortlyafterscouting locations, Barkdull, Ernest, and Davis then began recruiting Wesco 's
employees. They started with the managers. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 9.) This statement would be
true if it did not include Barkdull. Ernest and Davis did

of the recruiting. Barkdufl was

involved. There is nothing in the record to raise even an issue of fact as to Barkdull taking part in
therecruithg. It is not just an absence of evidence: the record overwhelming establishes that it was
Ernest and Davis who recruited each of the key employees. Each employee has been deposed and
there is no evidence that Barkdull made any offers to any of them. Wesco attempts to raise an
Respondent's Brief
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implication that Barkdull helped recruit Jenny l-Jancock (Idaho Falls manager) merely because Emest
took both Hancock and Barkdull to dinner at the same lime. Hancock makes it clear that it was
Emest, not Barkdull, who recruited her, and that her motives had to do with working for P&S' new
stores, not as aresult ofpressure from Barkdull. R. Vol. VII, p. 1361 (37518). Emest also clearly
did the recruiting of the Twin Falls key employees when he took the store manager and two sales
people (Dave Cristobal, Joel Johnston, and Travis Dayley) out to dinner and offered them jobs. R.
Vol. IV, pp. 614 (16: 5-17:25). Brady Barkdull was not present. The Twin Falls key employees
testified that they did not discuss their decision with Barkdull until after they had made up their
minds to quit. R. Vol. IV. pp. 615 (18:ll-13). The employees did speak with each other, and their
was a general feeling that if others quit, they would also quit. R. Vol. IV. pp. 615<18:24-19:6).
While in Twin Falls, Ernest and Davis also met with Jeffrey Peck, outside sales, and offered him a
job. Peck told Ernest and Davis he wanted to sleep on it, but called Emest the next morning at 7:30
a.m. and accepted the offer. Brady Barkdull was not present. Peck did not discuss his decision with
Barkdull until after he had made up his mind to quit. R. Vol. IV,pp. 674-675 (Peck, 32: 16-34:24).
Peck affirms

that while Ernest and Davis did disclose that they were making offers to other

employees, they did not disclose whether any of the other employees had accepted their offers. R.
Vol. lV,pp. 676 (Peck, 39:17-41:4).

"OnAugust 17, 2005, Howe and Wesco employee Mark Mortensen met in Pocatello to
discuss rumors that employees would be leaving en masse and starting workfor a competitor.
Barkdull, Hugh Barkdull, and Cook attended the meeting. All three lied to Wesco (Howe and
Mortensen) and assured them there no substance to the rumors. " (Appellant's Brief, p. 9.) The
Respondent's Brief
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cited record does not need to be read carefully to see that this is a misrepresentation of thetestimony.
There was no discussion of employees leaving en mass-the discussion was whether Brady Barkdull
was going to open his own store in Pocatello. Ile told Mortensen he was not going to. He did not
lie and there is no evidence of a lie. The same testimony also makes it clear that Cook and Hugh
Barkdull had not yet been given job offers. They did not Lie. R. Vol. V., p. 873-874, par. 4-5.
Accusing the Barkdulls and Cook of lying at this meeting is another distortion of the facts; the
accusation is not based on a reasonable inference from the evidence, and does not constitute a
genuine issue of material fact.

"BarkdulldiscussedwithPeckandDayEey their resignations." @.ppellant'sBrief,

p. 9-10.)

This is not so much a misrepresentation of the evidence as it is a blatant out of context statement
which omits the crucial fact: The discussions between Barkdull and Peck and Dayley took place

after Ernest and Davis had made job offers to Peck and Dayley. R. Val. 111, p. 472 (Barkdull, 79:1015, 80:16-24). Both Peck and Dayley testified that Barkdull did not speak with them about a job
offer and that they had already made up their minds before discussing their decisions with Barkdull.

R. Vol. IV, p. 660 (Dayley, 27:25-28,28:24-29,32:11-17; R. Vol. IV,p. 659-661; and R.'Vol. IV,
,pp.674-675,679 peck, 32:16-34:24,50:1-12).

"With their departurePom Wesco, the employees stole Wescoproprietary customer
information, computers, paint chip books,files, and Rolodexes. "

( Appellant's Brief, p. 11.)

Examining the record for support for this broad statementmakes it clear why the lower court rejected
the broad statement and found instead that the only things taken were a "paint book" (essentially a
free catalogue suppliedby apaint manufacturer), and a few business cards (which Johnston felt were
Respondent's Brief
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his own property). These items were taken by two of the employees who Wesco dismissed from the
case, making these minor events wholly irrele~ant.~
"Prior to resigning, the defendant employeesfaxedfrom the Idaho Stoves information about
their new businesses andtheir locations. " (Appellant's Brief, pp.12.) This is one of the most blatant
misrepresentations in the record, as proven by the very document Wesco refers the court to. R. Vol.

111, p. 426. This document was faxed on August 22, three days after the employees resigned. The
other two pages Wesco refers the court to are R. Vol. 111, p. 574 and 575, which are not dated, but
lack any evidence whatsoever that they were mailed from a Wesco store, or that they were sent
before August 22. Thus, the record is undisputed that the letter was faxed on August 22, three days
after the resignation. This is similar to the red herring Wesco puts forth in conjunction with Wes
Harris, an owner of a body shop in Preston, testifying that he was not able to recall the exact date he

receivedasimilardocument. The lower court ruled that a lack of recollection cannot be used to raise

an issue of fact as to whether the employeesbegan recruiting customersfor P&S before they resigned
from Wesco. Now, with evidence not available at the time Judge Smith made his ruling, we know
from the Affidavit of Cory Hansen that no documents were sent to customers until the new stores
opened on August 22. R Vol. V, pp. 903-9044 The bottom line is that there is no evidence that the

3Notethat it was Craig Rossum who made these broad accusations, but he did not even
work at the stores at the time of the resignation in August 2005, and he had only worked in Idaho
Falls. R. Vol. In, p. 514 (Rossum, 93:14-19). Mr. Rossum's broad accusations are not
corroborated by any witnesses with actual knowledge or who would actually know if anything
was taken.
4Thatthe flyers and letters were delivered after August 22 is also made clear by the
testimony of Marty Evans, who assisted Wesco between August 22 and 24 in contacting
RespondeM's Bnef
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employees contacted a single customer about their decision to quit prior to tiieir resignation from
Wesco.

D

Undisputed Facts Justifying Summary Judgment

Thus, we are left with the following undisputed facts:

1.

All of the employees who quit Wesco were at-will employees.

2.

None of the employees were bound by non-compete agreements.

3.

All eight of the "key" employeess who quit their jobs at Wesco, including managers and
sales people, were directly recruited by Ernest and Davis.

4.

Barkdull did not recruit, or make a job offer, to any other employee, including both "key"
and "non-key, "6 employees.

5.

Ernest and Davis did not ask Barkdull to recruit any other employees.

6.

Ernest and Davis did not ask any of Wesco's "key" employees to recruit "non-key
employees."'

customers and kept running into the P&S people who were also busy contacting customers
during the first few days that the P&S stores had opened. R. Vol. VII, p. 1237 (Evans, 6 3 5 64:4).
'These eight "key employees" include Brady Barkdull (outside sales manager), Hugh
Barkdull (outside sales in Pocatello), Mike Cook (store manager in Pocatello), Jenny Hancock
(store manager in Idaho Falls), Travis (store manager in Twin Falls), Jeffrey Peck (outside sales
in Twin Falls), Joel Johnston, (counter in Twin Falls), David Cristobal (counter in Twin Falls).
6Thefive "non-key" employees included Chantil Dobbs (delivery in Twin Falls), Shelby
Thomson and Kelly McClure (counter-worker and delivery in Idaho Falls), Jodee Reed and
Tiffany Thomsen (counter-worker and delivery in Pocatello).
'Each employee who quit Wesco had their own reasons for making the switch to P&S,
(and have testifieil about those reasons in detail). In recounting their reasons for switching to
Respondent's Brief
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7.

Of the "key" employees who discussed quitting with "non-key employees," only Cook is
still a defendant. (Wesco voluntarily dismissed the others from the suit.)

8.

None of the employees spoke lo customers, or sent documents to customers, about the new
P&S stores until after the employees had quit their jobs at Wesco.

9.

None of the employees who quit became owners in the new P&S stores; the employees all
took essentially the same job, at the same pay.

10.

Although Wesco remains suspicion that Cook erased some files off his computer, there is
no evidence that Wesco suffered any damage at all from Cook's decision to clean up his
computer before he left. All of Wesco's important data was stored on a central computer
in Washington, not on Cook's computer.
E.

The Law is clear that all allegations against Ernest, Davis, APWand P&S were
properly dismissed on summaryjudgment because they had the right to competefor
Wesco's customers and employees and did so in a manner that strictlyfollowed the
law.

The lower court correctly ruled that it was not illegal for Ernest, Davis, P&S and APW8to
open the three new stores; that it was legal for these four defendants to recruit Wesco's employees;
and that it was perfectly legal for these defendants to compete for Wesco's customers. Thus, all
causes of action against these four defendants were dismissed. The basis for their dismissal is
obvious: their conduct in recruiting employees, opening new retail stores and competing to supply

P&S, none of the employees attributed their decision to Barkdull. A few were disgruntled with
Wesco, but most made the switch because they knew and trusted Ernest, Davis, P&S and APW
in general. A few of the "non-key" employees quit only to avoid being left behind.
'Since APW did not own the three new stores, it is difficult to imagine why Wesco
brought suit against APW.
Rsspondent*~Bticf
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automotive paint and equipment to the Eastern Idaho market is well within the law, and within the
policy of the State of Idaho:
(1) The Idaho legislature finds that fair competition is fundamental to the free market
system. The unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of Idaho's economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and
the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment
conducive to the preservation of our democratic and social institutions.
(2) The purpose of this chapter is to maintain and promote economic competition in
Idaho commerce, to provide the benefits of that competition to consumers and
businesses in the state, and to establish efficient and economical procedures to
accomplish these purposes and policies.

Idaho Code § 48-102. The three new P&S stores definitely increased competition, which was good
for the employees, as well as for the consumers. Wages are up, prices are down and everyone is
happy, except Wesco.
In order to find liability against Ernest, Davis, P&S and APW, Wesco asks this court to create
new law. That new law would prohibit a company from recruiting at-will employees of other
companies. In deed, this new law would create a presumption of an "an improper purpose" and
would make it so that successful competition is proof that "wrongful means" had been used. It
would be a'tenible law, and would contradict the economic policyof the state.
Wesco attempts t'o use allegations of "interference with contract" to get at its competitors,
Ernest, Davis, P&S and APW, a i ~ dpoints out that even at-will employees have a contractual
relationship-albeit an "at-will" contractual relationship that could be interfered with. Such a rule
contradicts.the very law citedby Wesco: that to be actionable, offering a job to a eompetitor's
employee must be "Wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of interference itself."
Respondent's Brief
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couldnot be more plain, and the facts could not be more plain. Ernest andDavis offeredjobs to each
of Wesco's key employees. They did so to get them to quit Wesco and come to work for them. The
lower court's statement of the law was right, such conduct is legal and is avalid and important aspect
of our economy. The lower court was right to dismiss the allegations against Ernest, Davis, P&S
and APW.

l?

There is no evidence that Brady Barkdull, Hugh Barkdull and Mike Cook were
retained to recruit other employees.

Wesco seems to correctly perceive the iinpossibility of convincing this court that Ernest,
Davis, APW and P&S did not have the right to compete. Instead, Wesco focuses its attention on
Brady Barkdull, and to a lesser extent his brother Hugh and Mike Cook, attempting to cast these
employees as the true bad actors in its loss of its employees. Wesco asks to court to believe that it
was really Brady Barkdull who did the recruiting and that he was "aided and abetted" by Ernest and
Davis. Thus, Wesco attempts to focus the court's attention on whether Wesco's new employees
more or less recruited each other, hoping the court will look past the glaringly obvious missing fact,
which is the absence of a motive. None of the employees who quit Wesco became owners in the
new stores. Instead their motives are clearly stated in the record: dissatisfaction with being bought
out by Wesco; a trusting relationship with Ernest and Davis; and a fear of being left behind.
The real questions on appeal are: Where is the evidence that the Barkdulls or Mike Cook
were the guilty parties? Where is the evidence that Ernest and Davis asked the Barkdulls or Cook
to recruit other employees? Where is the evidence that any.keyemployees were recruited by anyone
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other than Ernest and Davis? Without being able to supply this evidence, Wesco has no justification
for its conspiracy theory.
G.

,

Idaho law allows employees to quit theirjobs andgo to workfor competitors or to
start their own competing businesses.

Wesco claims P&S should be held liable for Wesco's employees conduct pursuant to a rule
of law supposedly found in Alexander 61 Alexander Benefits Serv., Inc. v BeneJits Brokers
Consultants, Inc., 756 F. Supp 1408 (D. Or. 1991). There are several problems with plaintiff's

reliance on Alexander. First, Alexander is not an Idaho case and does not represent Idaho law
Second, Alexander relied on a comment in Restatement (2nd)of Agency 5 393, comment (e), to lend
supporito amling that went against strong legal precedent establishing an employee's right to make
preparations to compete. Third, Alexander is factually different because in Alexander it was a former
employee who was setting up the competing business; whereas in our situation the employees had
no ownership in the new stores. Fourth, there is zero evidence that Ernest and Davis "encouraged"
or "participated" any alleged improper conduct by the employees. Wesco has supplied no evidence
that Ernest and Davis told the employees when or how to write their letters of resignation, or that
Ernest and Davis sent prospective employees back to recruit other employees.
Wesco asks this court to focus on comment (e) from the Restatement (2"') of Agency 5 393,
claiming that the comment "clearly" makes it a breach of duty for an employee to solicit the "best"
employees. The Restatement comment does not "clearly" say this at all. It says:
e. Preparation for competition after termination of agency. After the termination of
his agency, in the absence of a restrictive ameement, the agent can properly compete
with his principal as to matters for which he has been employed. See 5 396.
before the termination of the aeencv, he is entitled to make arrangementsto compete,
Respondent's Brief
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except that he cannot properly use confidential information peculiar to h ~employer's
s
business and acquired therein. Thus, before the end of his employment. he can
properly purchase a rival business and upon termination of employment immediately
comuele. He is not, however, entitled to solicit customers for such rival business
before the end of his employment nor can he properly do other similar acts in direct
competition with the employer's business.
The limits of m p e r conduct with reference to securing the services offellow
em~loveesare not well marked. An employee is subject to liability if, before or after
leaving the employment, he causes fellow emplovees to break their contracts with the
employer. On the other hand, it is normally uermissible for employees of a firm, or
for some of its partners. to agree among themselves. while still employed, that they
will engage in competition with the ftrm at the end of the period specified in their
employment contracts.... [Underlining not in original.]
Further, it seems there are two facts presumed in comment e that do not exist in the Wesco case.
One is that the person soliciting his fellow employees is the one also setting up the competing
business. This crucial fact is missing: none of the employees had an ownership or other interest in
the new stores and none ofthem were promised bonuses for hiring other employees, a key element
present in every case where employees were found liable for recruiting. Wesco is asking the court
to stretchcomment (e) into aL'clear"rule prohibiting employees from speaking with each other about
their plans to quit or seek other employment-a rule that would directly contravene the remaining
language in the comment-that it is "normally permissible for employees

. . .to agree among

themselves . . . that they will engage in competition." These employees were simply choosing to
change jobs, at basically the same pay rate and levek They had no motive do to anything but try to
switch to an employer they felt more comfortable with. There is no rule making it illegal to tell other
employees of a plan to switch jobs.
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More recently, in Restatement (3'*) Of Agency § 8.04 (2006) we find the following Reporters
Note, explaining a change between the 2

"d

and 3"' Restatement that backs away from the

controversial parts of comment e:

a. Relationship to Restatement Second, Agency. This section is the counterpart of
Restatement Second, Agency $5 393 ,394, and 396(a). Although $394 is formulated
more broadly, requiring that an agent refrain from acting or agreeing to act "during
the period of his agency for persons whose interests conflict with those of the
principal in matters in which the agent is employed," the specific situations discussed
in the section involve action taken on behalf of a principal's competitors. &
T
formulation in this Restatement does not encompass an agent's agreement to act on
behalf of or to assist a com~etitor.This is because such a formulation appears to
contravene the well-settled right of emplovees and other agents to make preparations
to comDete. See Restatement Second, Agency $ 393 , Commenf, which recognizes
that "Lelven before the termination of the agency," the a ~ e n"is
t entitled to make
arrangements to compete, except that he cannot properlv use confidential'information
peculiar to his employer's business and acauired therein." Comment e continues,
"[tlhus. before the end of his emplovment, he can properlypurchase a rival business
and uvon termination of employment immediately compete." This Restatement does
not endorse Comment e's categorical assertion that an agent's ownership of a
competing business would not breach the agent's duties to the principal.
Restatement (31d) Of Agency 5 8.04 (2006), Reporter's Note (a). Despite the fact that the purpose
of the Restatement rule is to solidify an employee's right to quit and find better employment, or to
start his own competing business (not an issue in our case), Wesco asks the court to single out a
solitary comment in a note, and even claims this comment makes the law "clear" in its favor. What

is clear is that employees do have the right to quit their jobs and take better jobs. The fact that this
decision is made as part of a group cannot make it wrong. How can the law tell an at-will employee,
he has the right to quit without notice or reason, but if more than one of the employee tries to quit
at the same time, they're in big trouble? That is not the law. Keep in mind that, under the at-will
relationship Wesco had with these employees, Wesco could close its stores and fire all employees
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at any time without notice or reason, and it would not have broken any law. Why does Wesco think
the at-will doctrine should only work it its favor?
Wesco cites to R Homes Corp. v. Hcrr, 142 Idaho 87 123 P.3d 720 (Idaho App. 2005), which
is actually a case in the defendants' favor, wherein the court reaffirmed the same iower court's
decision granting summaryjudgment against an employer who sued its former employee for starting
a new company and hiring away many of the former employer's best people. The evidence in this
case is even more clear: Each employee has testified about being recruited by Ernest and Davis, not
by Barkdull.
Without having much luck finding Idaho cases to support its claims, Wesco turns to cases
from other states. In one case, Gresham &Associates., Inc. v. Strianese, 595 S.E.2d 82 (GA. Ct.
App. 2004), the court describes the facts that it 'felt could result in liability. These facts included a
defendant who specifically met with other employees and gave them job offers, including evidence
that he even arranged a loan so one employee could repay a 401 (k) loan before quitting. Gresham,
at 85. There is one very big difference between the facts in Gresham and Wesco's facts. In Gresham
the court could cite to facts in the records that raised a genuine issue of material fact. Wesco cannot
point to any such facts. It attempts to cast Barkdull in the same light as the defendant inGresham,
but fails to acknowledge that it was not Barkdull who made the job offers and, further, that there is
no evidence that Barkdull recruited the other employees.
Throughout its briefing, Wesco speaks often of the at-will employees having duties of
"absolute fidelity" and of a "high fiduciary duty;" however, no law is cited that requires an at-will
employee to give notice of his intention to quit his job, or prohibits an employee from discussing his
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plans to quit a job or to accept other employment. Likewise, there is no Idaho case requiring that an
at will employee warn his employer of his intention to quit, or to "rat out" other employees who are
thinking about taking another job, which are the two things Wesco claims Barkdull and Cook should
have done, despite their at-will status. In support of its claim that at-will employees have a duty of
"absolute fidelity," Wesco relies on R. G. Nelson, A.I. A. v. Steer, 118 Idaho, 409,412,797 P.2d 117,
120 (1990). A careful review of R. G. Nelson (by simply searching the case for the phrase "absolute
fidelity") shows that the phrase does not appear anywhere. R.G. Nelson does not use that phrase.
In fact , R.G. Nelson does not even deal with at-will employees, but with an architect's duty to his
client. R.G. Nelson does not support Wesco's case
In order to prevail in this case Wesco needs the court to agree to two rules of law that do not
exist: (1) That employees do not have the right to discuss with one another a decision to quit and
go to work for a different employer; and (2) if more than a few at-will employees quit at the same
time (the en masse resignation), they have broken a law or been actionably disloyal. Neither of these
propositions represent the law in Idaho.
Jenny Hancock, the Idaha Falls manager, best described the conflict she felt in making her
decision to quit. She describes trying to decide whether to give the customary two weeks notice, or
just to quit. She saw the dilemma. If she quits immediately she leaves Wesco with a problem of
replacing her. If she stays for two weeks, she will be accused of soliciting other employees and
customers, a problem many modem employers deal with by immediately terminating any employee
who gives notice of an intent to quit. She chose to quit immediately. She should not be liable for
her decision.
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NI

There is no evidence to support Wesco 's accusations of a Civil Conspiracy behoeen
the Defendants

In a desperate attempt to prove something illegal about ErnestlDavis/P&S's successful
recruitment of their former employees, Wesco makes broad allegations based on the simple fact of
a lunch meeting between Ernest and Davis and Barkdull. Even though it is known what happened
at that meeting, Barkdull was given a job offer which he declined to decide on immediately. He'
wanted to $ee what other employees were going to do first. Ignoring this evidence, Wesco asks this
court to speculate that they had a far more dark and sinister purpose. Wesco presumes, with no
evidence, that all of the testimony about the meeting is a lie and that this was really Barkdull and
Ernest and Davis formulating an evil plan to put Wesco out of business in Eastern Idaho. The best
Wesco can come up with is an accusation that Ernest and Davis invited Barkdull to be an "ally" in
a conspiracy to open new stores and to recruit Wesco's employees. Because Ernest and Davis were
successful, the court is asked to speculate that Barkdull was helping with the recruiting. This
speculation is requested despite the uncontroverted testimony of each and every employee describing
why they chose to work for P&S, without a single employee mentioning Barkdull as a causative
factor.
Wesco cites the conspiracy rule, but then forgets the rule. A civil conspiracy must be illegal
in some way other than the conspiracy itself. Yet we know that it is appropriate for one business to
solicit its competitor's at-will employees, thus what Ernest and Davis did cannot be considered to
be a civil conspiracy, since what they did was legal. If Wesco had a fact it could cite from the record
establishing that Barkdull agreed to do something illegal to recruit employees, it might have a case,
Rcspondcol's Brief

Page 29

but there is no such evidence.
The civil conspiracy claim was properly dismissed, as it was in the McPherson case
(McPherson v Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 64 P.3d 317 (2003), which is cited by Wesco, even though it

too resulted in the civil conspiracy claim being tossed out on summary judgment.
1:

Thefact that Wescopaidfor "good will" does not mean it is entitled to aprotected
monopoly, or that it is entitled to have its employees become indentured servants.

On a final note, Wesco makes much of its purchase of, and payment for, good will. The
question is, was Wesco victimized by unlawful competition, or was it victimized by its own failure
to properly evaluate the market and realize the weak position it would be in if Ernest and Davis, who
already had their own extensive good will in the area, refused to accept APW's losses and chose to
open new retail stores. Wesco appears to have paid far too much for the good will of a former owner
who did not actually have the good will to sell. Much of the good will in the Eastern Idaho market
already belonged to APW, Ernest, Davis and P&S. Wesco also claims it paid for employee loyalty,
without realizing that employee loyalty cannot be purchased, but must be earned. Wesco also paid
for customer loyalty, without realizing that customers prefer to have competition from multiple
sellers. Wesco's good will payment bought it only the right to be free from the former owner's
competition; Wesco could never purchase the right to enjoy a monopoly or to be free from
competition for its employees.

J:

Conclusion.

The biggest flaw in Wesco's argument is in the way it puts the cart before the horse. In its
anxiousness to prove an actionable case, Wesco attempts to re-characterize the case to make
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Barkdull the main character. At one point Wesco goes so far as to claim that Ernest and Davis
"aided and abetted" Barkdull in hiring away Wesco's employees. Completely forgetting that it was
not Barkdull who was starting a new business, that Barkdull had no motive to recruit anyone, and
that not a single employee claims to have been recruited by Barkdull. In Wesco's fictionalized
version of the facts, we have Barkdull starting a new business "aided and abetted" by Emest and
Davis. Wesco really needs to prove that Barltdull was asked to help Ernest and Davis, and that
Barkdull recruited the other employees for Ernest and Davis. There is no evidence of this. None
whatsoever. Wesco repeatedly refers to a "concocted scheme," a "conspiracy," a "secret plan"
betweenBarkdul1 and Ernest andDavis. Wesco never cites any evidence for this. Lacking any such
evidence, Wesco attempts the old trial tactic of repetition, repetition, repetition-believing that if it
makes the same false claim often enough, the court will start believing the fiction and not bother to
loolc at the actual evidence in the record.

Cross Appeal

I.

The defendant'slrespondent's should prevail on their cross-appeal and be granted a
o
provia breach
complete summary bdgment on all allegations because ~ e s c eannot
of dutyand,additionaUy, cannot prove any damages caused by any alleged misconduct.
Most of the defendants are already dismissed fiom this case, either by the court below or by

Wesco's voluntary dismissal of the employees. All that remain are Brady Barkdull, Hugh Barkdull
and Cook, and possibly P&S in some limited manner for accepting the benefit of anything unlayful
that was done. Based on a far more complete record than Judge Smith had when he granted the first
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summary judgment opinion in this matter, it is evident that a complete and full summary judgment
is warranted on behaif of the remaining defendants
The lower court cited Restatement 20dof Agency § 3939in its analysis. As discussed above,
in 2006, at about the time Judge Smith was writing his decision, the Restatement 3rdof Agency was
being published. It replaces 5 393 with:

3 8.04. Competition. Throughout the duration of an agency relationship, an agent
has a duty to refrain from competing
- with the orinci~aland from taking action on
behalf of or otherwise assistingthe principal's competitors.During that time, an agent
prevare
for competition followingmav take action, not otherwise wrongful, to .
.
termination of the agencv relationship. [Emphasis supplied.]

-

The underlined sentence is new, although the rule about preparing to compete was clearly stated in
the notes of the old version. Both legally and factually, the Barkdulls and Cook did not violate the
rule as stated in either the 2ndor the 3"1Restatement.
A.

Counts IandII (breach ofernployee duty of loyallyl should be disrnissedagainst the
Barkdulls and Cook because there is no evidence that either ofthern bveached theiv
duties.
1.

Neither of the Barkdulls recruited any other employees. All key
employees were recruited directly by P&S and all non-key employees
learned about the jobs from other employees, not from the Barkdulls.

There is no evidence to refute Brady's testimony that he was not asked to recruit other
employees, that he did not talk to other employees about resigning until after they had made their
decisions to quit, and that he himself was being recruited by Ernest and did not make up his mind

'The Restatement 2ndof Agency 393 stated simply: "Unless otherwise agreed, an agent
is subject to a duty not to compete with the principal concerning the subject matter of his
agency."
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for sure until after some of the other employees. R. Vol. 111, p. 578." None of the key employees
claim that Brady recruited them and there is no evidence that he extended job offers to any of the
employees. The evidence overwhelmingly establishes that Barkdull was not involved in recruiting.
R. Vol. IV, p 674 (Peck, 32:16-33:ll); R. Vol. IV, p. 612 (Dayley, 49:3-7); R. Vol. IV, p. 642-643

(Johnston, p. 22:8-28:20; R. Vol. IV, p. 613-615 (Cristobal, 13:2-19:19); R. Vol. 111, p. 489, (Cook,
-51 :25-52:21)." This evidence is undisputed and, even construed fully in favor of Wesco, cannot be
characterized as an effort by Barkdull to recruit employees to work for P& S while he was still an
employee of Wesco. He breached no duty of loyalty.
Giving Wesco the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the most that can be said is that, after
Davis and Ernest offeredjobs to Wesco's key employees, including Brady Barkdull, some of the key
employees discussed their decisions with each other and with non-key employees, but this clearly
did not iiivolve Brady offeringjobs to anyone, or even influencing anyone. Without evidence of any
recruiting conduct by Brady, the remaining portions of Counts I and 11should be dismissed against
him.

''The closest thing Wesco can point to is the fact that Barkdull was present at dinner
when Ernest made the offer to Hancock. However, her testimony is very clear that she was given
the job offer by Ernest and that her decision to leave was not based on pressure from Brady. Her
reasons for quitting do not include any evidence that she was influenced at all by Brady. She had
known Ernest for 2 years, as the owner of APW, and her decision was a choice to work for him,
rather than Wesco. R, Vol. 111, p. 494 (Hancock, 24:7-19). She disagreed with Wesco's
attorney's assertion that Barkdull had "greased" the situation. R. Vol. 111, p. 497 (Hancock, 37:s18).
"Although Brady had a telephone conversation with Dayley, and possibly other
employees on Friday, the day of their resignation, it is clear that the others had already made the
decision to resign after being recruited by Ernest and Davis. R. Vol. 111, p. 472-473 (Barkdull,
78:7-82: 17).
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As to Hugh Barlcdull, there is no evidence of recruiting whatsoever. It appears that Wesco
does not really even take the position that Hugh Barkdull did anything improper, as Wesco fails to
discuss him in its brief. Thus, Hugh Barkdull should also be dismissed from the suit

2.

Cook's conduct in mentioning his resignation to fellow employees and in
drafting a form letter of resignation that was used by other employees is not
actionable and caused no damage.

Cook was recruited by Ernest on Wednesday evening, August 17,2005. After he made up
his mind to resign, he downloaded a resignation form letter from the internet that was copied by
other employees in Pocatello and Twin Falls. In light of the rule stated in Restatement 3'* of Agency

5 8.04, it is clear that Cook's conduct is not actionable and does not amount to a breach of duty.
This is because it is undisputed that the letter was given to other employees only after they had
already decided to resign. R. Val. IV, p. 661 (Dayley, 33:l-15); . R. Vol. 111, p. 471 (Barkdull,
76:15); R. Vol. IV, p. 645 (Johnston, 33:6-24); R. Vol. VII, par. 11.. The employees have explained
that it was more convenient to use the same resignation letter Mike had found on the internet than
for each employee to take the time to write their own letters. There is no evidence that Cook did
anything to influence the other employees, or that he was asked to influence other employees.
Without such evidence, the remaining portions of Counts I and I1 should be dismissed against Cook
On Friday, August 19, after he decided to switch employers, Cook announced his plan to quit
to the two counter-help people working in the same store. They decided to quit as well. What is
completely lacking is any evidence that Cook was told to recruit these employees. This was not the
unfolding of a secret scheme; it was an employee deciding to quit his job and then inviting two other
workers to do the same thing. This case is nothing like the cases cited by Wesco where an employee
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decided to copy his employer's business model and begins malting plans months in advance to not
only copy the business model, but to take the employees and customers with him, and then this
employee continues to work as a "wolf in sheep's clothing" to cariy out his plan over a period of
weeks or months. Without proof of a "conspiracy" or "evil plan" the court should rule as a matter
of law that Cook's conduct is not actionable.
B.

Counts I and II against Brady and Cookshouldalso be dismissed because Wescohas
no proof of any damage caused by their conduct.

An equally compelling reason for dismissing Counts I and I1 against Brady and Cook is that
there is no evidence that their actions in this regard caused any damage to Wesco.' Count I,
Interference with Prospective Advantage, is a tort, and proof that damages were proximately caused
by negligent conduct is an essential element of every tort, including a tortious interference with
contract. Magic Valley TruckBrokers, Inc. vs. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110,982 P.2d 945 (1999). Count
11, Breach of ContractBreach of Duties, is arguably a contract action (Judge Smith held that the duty
of loyalty is implied in the unwritten contract between every employer and employee), and the law
requires that a plaintiff establish, with "reasoaable certainty" a causal link between the breach of
contract and the damages claimed.
As unfair as it may seem to a disappointed plaintiff in a business loss case where nothing can
be recovered, the rule in Idaho is quite clear that proof of damages must be specifically proven and
causation for those damages must be shown. Proof of damages is an element of a law suit and no
matter how upset the plaintiff may be that he feels a wrong has been done, if he cannot prove his
damages, and that a legal wrong caused the damages, his case has no value. Dunn v. Ward, 105
Idaho 354,357,670 P.2d 59,62 (1983). There are numerous cases where a business plaintiffs case
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has been dealt a fatal blow for failing to have any proof of damages. For instance, in Dunn the court
found that there was a clear and admitted violation of a non-compete agreement, but ruled that there
was not a specific proof of damage and awarded plaintiff nothing. The supreme court affirmed:
In this case the trial judge found that Dunn failed to prove the amount of his damages
with reasonable certainty. First, he presented no evidence at all showing any loss of
business, loss of customers or loss ofprofit to his own business attributable to Ward's
breach. In addition, although Dunnpresented some prodof Ward's profits, he failed
to show any relation between those profits and Dutnl's losses. 'Ward testified as to
gross sales to particular customers.,but failed to provide any figures to indicate how
many ~rohibiteditems were sold in each zroup-rofit
was included on
a "per prohibited item" basis. Because of thislack of proof on the part of Dunn, we
hold that the trial court was correct in enteringjudgment for Ward as to the claimed
lost profits.
Dunn, at 358,63. This is very similar to what Wesco is attempting to do in this case. It wishes to
tell the jury that it made $4.5 million less than it hoped for, but gives no explanation of what
wrongful conduct caused the losses. Dunn makes it clear that this is improper and Wesco cannot
prove any damages. A failure to establish a causal link between the alleged facts and the claimed
damages is fatal to both a tort and a contract action. Dunn v. Ward, 105 Idaho 354,357,670 P.2d

A review of the Idaho cases on damages shows that the law distinguishes between the level
of proof required to prove the element of the existence of damages caused by the alleged conduct,
which requires "reasonable certainty," $nd the required proof of the amount of damages caused by
the alleged conduct, which requires less certainty.
Obviously the amount of damages caused only becomes an issue if the existence of some
damages caused by wrongful conduct has first been proven with "reasonable certainly." Wesco's
insistence that it need only prove that the remaining Defendants' conduct was a "substantial factor"
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in its losses is skipping over the first element. Wesco must first prove that Defendants' caused some
damage with "reasonable certainty," and then must also prove the conduct was a "substantial factor"
in the cause of the loss. Wesco fails in both respects. Note that the focus on both issues is on
causation; it is not enough to prove damages, if there is no causal link between the damages and
wrongful conduct. See Trilogy Networks Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 177 P.3d 1119 (Idaho 2007),
where the trial court specifically agreed that there had been a breach of a non-compete clause but
then entered a judgment for no money. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed:
Trilogy failed to persuade the district court of any correspondence between what its
profit would have been and Johnson's actual profit, and thus failed to take the
measure of its damages out of the realm of speculation. Therefore, thc district court
did not err when it declined to award damages.

Trilogy, at 1 119. Thus, because plaintiff did not make a specific link between the breach of contract
and an item of damages, its case failed.

Magic Valley Truckis exactly on point against Wesco's case. The decline in Wesco's profits
could have been caused by, among many other possible causes, the at-will employees resigning, the
absence of non-compete agreements, and lawful competition from P&S which was going to occur
whether the employees lee Wesco or not. Wesco has failed entirely to prove a link between their
$4.5 million damage claim and any alleged misconduct. Another case, R.G. Nelson, A.I.A. v. Steer,
118 Idaho, 409,412,797 P.2d 117, 120 (1990), cited by Wesco on a different point also ruled that,
regardless of whether there was a breach of duty, or an inference, if there is no proof of damages
there is no valid cause of action: R.G. Nelson, 41 1, 119.
This lack o f a causal link can exist either: (1) where there is no proof that the conduct caused
any harm, or (2) where there is proof that the loss would have occurred anyway, regardless of the
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defendant's conduct. IDJI 2.30.2; Restatement of Torts 2d 5 432,433. Both of these defects exist
in Wesco's claim for damages.
For example, in a case where an employee was found to have breached his duty of loyalty
to his employer by assisting a competitor that he planned to go to work for, the case was dismissed.
Despite clear proof of wrongful conduct, the court dismissed the action because of lack of proof of
causation ofdamages. Cudahy Co. vs. America Laboratories, Inc., 3 13 F.Supp. 1339,1349(D. Neb.
1970).12 This absence of proof of damages has also been the basis for the dismissal of suits against
former employees in other cases, as in SaksFifrh Avenue, Inc. v. James, LTD., 630 S.E.2d 304 (Va.
2006).
While the cases cited above were not decided on summary judgment, the law stated in these
cases controls the result here and compels summary judgment because there is no evidence in this
case to support the link between losses claimed and actionable conduct. For instance starting in

Trugreen Companies, LLC vs. Scotts Luwn Service, 508 F.Supp.2d 937 (2007), and continuing in
Trugreen v. Moweu, 2007 WL 1696860 (same case), a suit that is amazingly similar to Wesco's, a
Utah court relied on Idaho law to grant summary judgment to the Idaho defendants.'"

'To show how similar Wesco's case is to Cudahy, consider the court's next remark,
demonstrating that the court had been dealing with the s&e type of generalization of damages
that Wesco is attempting in this case: "The Court would only further add that plaintiff in its
arguments, has made claim that all of these actions on the p& of all of the defendants are
combined in a calculated plan to steal plaintiffs suppliers and customers. If there is no actionable
wrong as to any of the parts of what plaintiff terms a calculated plan the sum of the whole can be
no different." Cudahy, 1349.
13Asto the Utah claims in Trugreen, the judge certified the issue to the Utah Supreme
Court to see if Utah would adopt the same law as Idaho had adopted in the Dunn case, which it
now has in Trugreen Companies, LLC. vs. Mower Brother Inc., 199 P.3d 929 (2008).
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This analysis applies to Wesco's case. Essentially,as inSaks and Trugreen, it is obvious that
Wesco's claimed $4.5 million dollar loss was caused by numerous factors unrelated to the remaining
allegations in this case. These other factors, which constitute lawful competition include: (I) the
existence of the new P&S stores, (2) the lawful recruitment of keyemployees by Ernest and Davis,

(3) lawful competition from former key employ.ees who were lawfully recruited, (4) the employees
were at-will employees, (5) competition from employees who were not bound by non-compete
agreements, (6) the goodwill that Ernest and Davis already had in Idaho whellthey opened the stores,
with or without the help ofthe employees, (7) the lawfiil resignation ofnon-key employees who were
at-will and who had no contact with the remaining Defendants during the time they made the
decision to resign, (8) the resignations of at-will employees who could have quit at any time for any
reason, (9) the fact that some damages were caused by ~ e s c o ' sown poor relationship with its
employees, (10) the absence of evidence that any employees who were not directly recruited by
Ernest or Davis (the "non-key" employees) had any effect on any customers switching their business,

(1 1) the fact that some of Wesco's alleged losses may have been caused by employees whom Wesco
recently dismissed fromthe case, and finally, (12) Wesco's own faults incausing its own losses, such

as operating under the misguided belief that it should never have to worry about competition from
any source, apparently paying far too much for avulnerable company, failing to make its employees
feel secure, and failing to require non-compete agreements of key employees.
The cause of Wesco's losses are obvious and have nothing to do with wrongful conduct by
the Barkdulls or Cook. Without being able to prove this causal link, s m a r y judgment should be
granted
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1.

There is no evidence that Brady Barkdull's conduct caused any
damage to Wesco because all such damage would have occurred
anyway due to the lawful competition of others.

Even if it could be shown that Brady wrongfully recruited key employees, (which cannot be
shown as outlined above), the damage issue is whether such wrongful recruiting, if it could be
proven, caused Wesco a loss. There is no such evidence at all. There is no proof of a link between
Brady's conduct and the alleged $4.5 million dollar loss.
In other words, if Wesco's damages are the loss of profits associated with customers going
to P&S, Wesco has failed entirely to establish even one of the numerous links that would have to be
proven between Brady recruiting a key employee and a customer leaving, keeping in mind that if the
customer would have left anyway, damages have not been and camot be proven.
For instance, once Brady quit, there is no prohibition against him recruiting the employees.
Thus, if Brady recruited employees after he quit and persuaded them all to follow him, this would
have been perfectly legal, and Wesco's claimed loss of profits would be exactly the same.
The result is the same if Brady had gone away to an isolated island without his cell phone,
leaving only Ernest and Davis to recruit, which is about what happened, since Brady did no
recruiting. Ernest and Davis would have successfully recruited the same employees without Brady,
and Wesco's losses would be the same. Wesco cannot link any conduct by Brady to their claimed
losses, and this requires the dismissal of Counts I and II against him.

2.
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There is no evidence that Cook's downloading a resignation form
letter and sharing it with other employees caused any damage to
Wesco because ail such damage would have occurred anyway since
the other employees had already made up their minds about quiting.

Tl~esame principles apply to the claims against Mike Cook in Counts I and 11. There is no
evidence that Cook's drafting a letter of resignation, which was then used by other employees caused
Wesco any damage. There is no evidence any employee chose to resign because they were given a
resignation form letter prepared by a co-employee. More importantly, there is no evidence a
customer lefi or that Wesco lost a single sale because any employee used Cook's resignation form.
Without this link there is no support for Wesco's losses having been caused by any act of Mike
Cook.
Another way to look at this issae is that, legally, as at-will employees, the employees did not
have to give any notice whatsoever. They could have quit at any time without notice or cause. They
could legally have simply walked off the job on Friday or simply not shown up on Monday. Such
conduct may have been rude, but not actionable. The point is, there is no proof that the use of
Cook's letter caused Wesco any damage. The key employees had already determined to quit before
they saw Cook's letter and decided to copy it. Ernest and Davis would have opened the P&S stores
anyway and the customers would have left despite what form of resignation letter was used. Cook
should be dismissed from Counts I and I1 for lack of proof of damages. R. Vol. 1238-1244.

C.

Count V against Brady Barkdull, Hugh Barkdull, Mike Cook; and P&S should be
dismissed because there is no evidence that Brady, Cook, or Hugh Barkdull caused
any damage through customer confusion, or that P&S benefittedwrongfullyfrom any
customer confusion caused by its new employees.

For this issue the court below found that there was an issue of whether the employees caused
customer confusion by allegedly wearing P&E clothing after going to work for P&S or by using the
same personal cell phones they hadused as Wesco employees after going to work for P&S. Judge
Smith was not presented with the issue of whether such conduct, if it could be proven, caused any
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losses. The proof of loss on this would be simple - show that a single customer accidentally ordered
from the wrong store because Brady, Hugh or Mike were using P&E shirts or the same cell phones.
There is a glaring absence of any proof in the record that even a single customer was confused into
ordering paint or supplies from the wrong store. Without such evidence CountV must be dismissed
against all of the remaining Defendants.
The scant evidence Wesco seems to rely on is a vague claim that someone-not a
customer-saw a P&S employee wearing a shirt with a Paint & Equipment logo on it, and that
someone-not a customer-called ace11phone of a former employee and heard an answering message
that still saidPaint & Equipment. Within ten days of thenew stores opening, the employees changed
their cell phone numbers to make sure this was not a problem. The important point though, is that
not one single customer has ever claimed to have been confused into making an order with the wrong
company. Wesco has no proof whatsoever that any damages were caused by customer confusion.
Wesco's suspicion that P&S employees might have done something wrong, or tried to confuse their
customers is not evidence. There simply is no proof of any damages caused by customer confusion.
There is no evidence P&S accepted a benefit of any customer confusion, and no evidencethat
Hugh Barkdulli4,Brady, or Cook, did anything to cause confusion. Count V should be dismissed
entirely at this point for lack of proof of wrongful conduct and a complete lack of proof of any
damage, based on the law as stated in conjunction with Counts I and 11, above. Thus, P&S should
be dismissed entirely on summary judgment.

I4~here
is a particular absence of evidence against Hugh Barkdull. It is a mystery to the
Defendants why Wesco did not dismiss Hugh with the other employee defendants in February 2008.
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D.

Counts VII; VIII and X against Cook should be dismissed because Wesco has no
evidence ojany losses caused by Cook's deletion of$lesfrom the Wesco computer
he used.

Wesco has accused Cook of removing confidential information from its computer for his use
at P&S, or of depriving Wesco of the benefit of information by deleting it. The accusations are
contained in Count VII (Computer Fraud Act), Count VIII (Misappropriation of Trade Secrets), and
Count X (Conversion). Cook denies doing anything harmful to the computer and has testified that
on the day he resigned he removed his personal files and programs from the computer at work and
reorganized the files on the computer to make it easier for whoever replaced him to use the
computer. He admits that his personal file included a list of customers and their phone numbers he
had created for his own use. R. Vol. I, p. 128 (Cook, par. 5).
The basis of this renewed motion to dismiss the computer issues focuses on two issues: (A)
that 18 USCA $ 1030 is inapplicable because the computer was not a "protected computer" under
the act and (B) all computer related counts should be dismissed because of the lack of evidence of
any damages caused by Cook's actions.
1.

18 USCA $ 1030 (Count VII) is not applicable to this computer or to
the type of allegations made against Cook

A civil action under 18 USCA 5 1030 "may be broughtJ
no

if the conduct involves one (1)

of the factors set forth in clause (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), or (v) of subsection (a)(5) (B)." [Emphasis added].
The only section-that could be relevant is (iii), which states:

(A) Whoever(S)(iii) intentionally accesses a protected computer without
authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage.

The key terms in this paragraph are "protected computer" and "damage" both of which are defined
in tile code. Judge Smith focused on the term "damage" but did not (because no one asked him to)
focus on the term "protected computer," which is defined:
(2)

The term "protected computer" means a computer-(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United
States Govenunent, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for
such use, used by or for a financial institution or the United States
Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects that use
by or for the financial institution or the Government; or

(B) which is used in interstate or foreign colnmerce or
communication, including a computer located outside the United
States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign
commerce or communication of the United States;
18 USCA § 1030(e)(2). Obviously Cook's work computer was not owned by afinancial institution
or by the United States Government. Likewise there is no evidence it was used in interstate
commerce. This computer was not part of Wesco's conlputer system, nor was it linked to the
computers at Wesco's home offices. It was used by Cook for local tasks only. Thus, 18 USCA 1030
does not apply and Count VE should be dismissed.
2.

Counts VII, VIJI and X should be dismissed because there is no
evidence of any loss or damage caused by Cook's actions as they
relate to the computer.

Cook admits deleting certain programs and files from the Wesco computer he used.
Specifically, in his Affidavit Cook testifies that he did not take customer lists, or any other business
information, but that he did delete his personal files and some programs he had installed. R. Vol.

I, p. 128 (Cook Affidavit, par. 5). Cooks deposition supports this. He admits deleting his "work
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folder" and his programs. R. Vol. VII, p. 1333, (Cook, 21:9-18). He admits this "work folder"
contained a list of customers and their telephone numbets, a spreadsheet that would calculate a
percentage of a number (similar to a very simple calculator), and some old letters that had been
written to customers. That is all the evidence there is. Wesco cannot dispute this.
The question is, did this deletion of files cause Wesco a loss? It seems apparent that
customers and phone numbers were readily available through the other computers, which were
hoolced up to the main Wesco system where all invoices and billing were kept. The point is, Wesco
has failed anywhere to establish a causal link between having any files deleted by Cook, and any
damages. Likewise, Cook admits deleting an old letter written to customers. Wesco has failed to
maice any link between copies of old letters and any ascertainable loss. The truth is that Cook was
cleaning up his computer, and left it in a condition ready for Wesco's use by whatever employee
replaced Cook. Nothing he did on that computer caused any harm or loss to Wesco and the computer
related counts should all be dismissed. There is also no proof that he took any "trade secrets" or used
them to compete with Wesco.

CONCLUSION
All of the remaining counts, and all of the remaining Defendants, should be dismissed from
this suit in a full and complete summaryjudgment.
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